The State of Utah v. Jose Francisco Arroyo : Brief of Respondent by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1988
The State of Utah v. Jose Francisco Arroyo : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David L. Wilkinson; attorney general; Sandra L. Sjogren; assistant attorney general; attorney for
appellant.
Walter F. Bugden; attorney for respondent.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Utah v. Arroyo, No. 880062 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/855
BFUEFA 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
DOCKET NO — — 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
JOSE FRANCISCO ARROYO, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Case Noi. 880062-CA 
Priority 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Appeal from an Order Suppressing 
In the Fourth District Court, In and F 
State of Utah, the Honorable Ray M, Hard 
Evidence 
or Juab County, 
mg, Presiding 
Walter 
Attor 
257 To\4 
257 Ea 
Salt L^ 
ney 
dt 
F. Bugden, Jr. 
for Respondent 
er, Suite 340 
200 South - 10 
ke City, Utah 84111 
David L. Wilkinson 
Attorney General 
Sandra L. Sjogren 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellant 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
F I L E D 
MAY 2 51988 
Clerk of the Otr frt 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant , 
v. 
JOSE FRANCISCO ARROYO, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Case No. 880062-CA 
Priority 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Appeal from an Order Suppressing 
In the Fourth District Court, In and For 
State of Utah, the Honorable Ray M. Harld 
Evidence 
Juab County, 
ing, Presiding 
Walter F. Bugden, Jr. 
Attorney for Respondent 
257 ToWer, Suite 340 
257 Ea^t 200 South - 10 
Salt LcMce City, Utah 84111 
David L. Wilkinson 
Attorney General 
Sandra L. Sjogren 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellant 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 3 
ARGUMENT 4 
POINT I THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT 
THE STOP OF THE RESPONDENT WAS A 
MERE PRETEXT FOR AN INVESTIGATIVE 
SEARCH IS AMPLY SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD 4 
POINT II THE RESPONDENT'S CONSENT WAS 
FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE 10 
POINT III ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION CONFERS GREATER 
PROTECTION THAN THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
PROTECTIONS SECURED BY THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 14 
CONCLUSION 15 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 16 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases Cited 
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) 10 
Lindsay v. State, 698 P.2d 659 (Akaska App. 1985) 12 
Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (19 39) 10 
People v. Keogh, 46 Cal.App.3d 919, 120 Cal.,Rptr. 817 . . . 11 
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 
251 U.S. 385 (1920) 10 
State v. Ashe, 745 P. 2d 1255 (Utah 1987) 4 
State v. Branch, 743 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1987) 4 
State v. Bullock, 699 P. 2d 753 (Utah 1985) 4 
State v. Earl, 716 P. 2d 803 (Utah 1986) 15 
State v. Hygh, 711 P. 2d 264 (Utah 1985) 15 
State v. Lafferty, 73 Utah Adv.Rpts 56 (l/llj/88) 9 
State_v^_Larocco, 742 P.2d 89 (Utah 1987) 15 
State v. Mendoza, 748 P. 2d 181 (Utah 1987) 9 
State v. Mitchell, 360 SO. 2d 189 (LA. 1978) 12 
State v. Ragesdale, 381 SO. 2d 492 (LA. 1980) 12 
State v. Raheem, 464 SO. 2d 293 (LA. 1985) 12 
State v. Sierra, Utah Court of Appeals, May 18, 1988 . . . . 9 
State v. Tuttle, 399 P. 2d 580 (Utah 1965) 4 
State v. Valdez, 748 P. 2d 1050 (Utah 1987) 12, 13 
United States v. Gooding, 695 F.2d 78 (4th dir. 1982) . . . 12 
United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448 (lOtih Cir. 1985) . . 13 
ii 
United States v. Sanchez-Jaramillo, 
637 P.2d 1094 (7th Cir. 1980) 12 
United States v. Taheri, 648 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1981). . 11f 12 
United States v. Thompson, 712 F.2d 356 (11th Cir. 1983) . . 11 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (19630 10 
Constitutional Provisions Cited 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV 2, 14, 15 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 14 2, 14, 15 
iii 
WALTER F. BUGDEN, JR. #480 
Attorney for Respondent 
257 Towers, Suite 340 
257 East 200 South - 10 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7282 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEjAL 
ooOoo 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
JOSE FRANCISCO ARROYO, 
Defendant/Respondent 
ooOoo 
BRIEF QF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 880062-CA 
Priority 2 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is an interlocutory appeal from an order suppressing 
evidence in a case charging the Respondent v^ ith a second degree 
felony. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Was the trial court's conclusion th[at the stop of the 
Respondent was a mere pretext for an investigative search clearly 
erroneous? 
2. Was the Respondent's consent to search his truck the 
fruit of the poisonous tree? 
3. Does Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution 
1 
confer a greater protection than the Fourth Amendment protection 
secured by the Federal Constitution? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Amendment IV, United States Constitution: 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
Article I, Section 14, Utah Constitution: 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures 
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall 
issue but upon probable cause supported by 
oath or affirmation, particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the person or 
thing to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Respondent relies upon the Findings of Fact entered by 
Judge Ray M. Harding (a copy of which is included with the 
Appellant's Brief). Additionally, the Respondent notes that the 
trial court disbelieved the testimony of Trooper Mangelson. 
Indeed, the trial court specifically found that the Respondent's 
testimony was credible (FF. 15) in contrast to the Trooper's 
testimony (FF. 16). 
Additionally, although it is true, as the State has asserted 
2 
in its Statement of Facts that Trooper Mangelson did cite the 
Respondent for Following Too Close and for Driving on an Expired 
Driver's License, those citations were issued only after Trooper 
Mangelson had searched the Respondent's vehicle and only after 
the Respondent had been arrested for Possession of a Controlled 
Substance. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Based upon numerous inconsistencies between the testimony of 
the arresting officer at the preliminary hearing and his testimony 
at the suppression hearingf the trial court correctly concluded 
that there was no violation for "Following Too Close" and that 
the Trooper lacked any reasonable or articulable suspicion to 
stop the Respondent. The trial court also correctly concluded 
that the pretextual stop was employed by the Trooper to conceal 
his genuine investigative purpose. The citation for Following 
Too Close was simply a pretext utilized by the arresting officer 
to justify the stop of a vehicle with out of state license plates 
and with occupants of a Latin origin. Pretext stops are 
unconstitutional. 
Consent to search which is obtained after an illegal arrest, 
entryr or detention and the evidence seized during that search 
are "fruit of the poisonous tree". The Trooper exploited the 
primary illegality - the stop of the Respondent - to obtain his 
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consent to search the vehicle. The consent was not obtained by 
any means which were substantially independent of the illegal 
stop of the vehicle. 
The State constitutional protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures is greater in scope than the umbrella pro-
tections conferred by the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. Under Utah Constitutional preceptsf any prior 
illegality taints and vitiates a consent which flows from the 
prior unlawful conduct. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT THE STOP OF THE 
RESPONDENT WAS A MERE PRETEXT FOR AN INVESTIGATIVE 
SEARCH IS AMPLY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD 
In the absence of clear error, a trial court's factual 
assessments underlying a decision to grant or deny a suppression 
motion is upheld on appeal. State v. Ashef 745 P.2d 12 55 (Utah 
1987); State v. Branch, 743 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1987); State v. 
Bullock, 699 P.2d 753f 755 (Utah 1985); State v. Tuttle, 399 
P.2d 580, 582 (Utah 1965). In this case, the trial judge care-
fully considered the testimony of both Trooper Manqelson and the 
Respondent. In the Court's Findings of Fact, it is clear that 
the trial judge simply did not believe Trooper Mangelson's testi-
mony that the Respondent was stopped for Following Too Close. 
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Instead, the trial court found the testimony of the Respondent to 
be more credible on the crucial issue of whether the Respondent 
was indeed following another vehicle on the interstate too closely. 
Although the State has attempted to argue in its Brief that 
the Respondent's own testimony supports the conclusion that the 
Respondent was following another vehicle too closely on the 
interstate, the State's argument overlooks the Respondent's une-
quivocal testimony that he was eight car len|gths behind the closest 
vehicle in front of his own vehicle (T. 44)• Since the rule of 
thumb according to the Trooper is one car le|ngth for each ten 
miles of speed and because the Respondent's speed was about 55 
miles per hour, eight car lengths was an appropriate and lawful 
distance. Although the State is correct that the Respondent did 
testify that he was about 95 feet behind the car immediately in 
front of him, the State has neglected to poitat out that this 
estimate of distance was just that - an estimate. The 
Respondent's complete statement was, "It coulld be about 95, I 
guess, maybe feet" (T.48). Upon further cro^s-examination, the 
Respondent also responded, when challenged b\/ the prosecutor as to 
the 95 foot estimate, "I really do not know how to multiply 
those, how to get the result." (T. 49). Th^s, although the 
Respondent was not certain about his estimate in feet, his esti-
mate, as expressed in car lengths, was unequivocal. 
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The State has asserted in its Brief that the facts in this 
case do not support the trial court's conclusion that Trooper 
Mangelson trumped up the traffic violation merely as a pretext. 
The State argues that this is so because Trooper Mangelson did 
not determine that the Respondent was Hispanic until after he 
turned through the median and after he had decided to take enfor-
cement action. The State has also attempted to support this 
position by pointing out that the Court only found that Trooper 
Mangelson "may have" seen that the license was out of state prior 
to turning around to apprehend the Respondent (FF. 4, 16). What 
the State overlooks is that the trial court made no explicit 
finding as to precisely when Trooper Mangelson decided to make 
the pretext stop. The State seems to suggest that a pretext stop 
could only be found if Trooper Mangelson decided to make the pre-
text stop before he executed the U-turn and caught up with the 
Respondent's vehicle. Although it is possible that the Trooper 
decided to make the pretext stop before he executed the U-turn, 
it is no less a violation of the Respondent's Fourth Amendment 
rights if the Trooper instead decided to make the pretext stop 
after he had caught up with the Respondent's vehicle, observed 
that the driver and passenger were both Hispanic and that the 
vehicle had out of state license plates. The Trooper's testimony 
made it clear that the Highway Patrol has taught its officers 
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t h a t t h e i n t e r s t r 
t r a n s p o r t a t i ^ n ^! ':r)'it . . . i i - . j -: J. •->:,-> nc^s *: . . * ! * o o p e r ' s 
t e s t i n o H v al - , -"evealed -r.a* , i s* i n~* i * . v n a c ; co lo red t h o 
- ss i spa i 1 ^* 
Q: And when, you see a Hispanic with out of state 
license plates, that is the kind of hunch that 
would at least suggest to you, "I want to stop 
and look in this guy's car. He might be a 
drug smuggler " Is that the kind of hunch yoi i 
work on? 
A: Yes. 
(T. L3-14) 
^mali. - i' *"^  Scar^ w.*.r*< \ . - ^ •-• * -t the 
demeanor an:i -andor i rc>^ - Mangel son md a:rer consi d- -i i •: 
.ix3 * ^:;i!no° iw jdxta:* aiioii V -' fKi r ^pondenc • * *-' 
four . - .- ;t -.oopr to h- ,.OQQ r>r^ _ ;y, 3 \n. tess per sua s .. x;-r m a ; 
the Responden: (r,f;* \-* . - » . .J . =- *'_ - ( .S-"A:^ =I rar - rv- ao, *, 
liouper Man a* =v * • ; d 
^rorp his test iiiiony *, . ,- pi - ~*M uarv he.^' i!i.. '** ~ ; 'jop- : wa -
evasive and reluctant to admit that he had testified at. the pre-
I iii! iiiic 1 h e a t" i tiq t h a i " H I M ma/joa i t \ r! I la" p^op]»j atupp^d I y I h^ 
Highway Patrol for transporting drugs were Columbians, Cubans, 
and Hispanics (T, 10) Mi the suppression hearing, the Trooper 
was "i I so i e J ui "la nl Lo adim 11 l. ha 1 he had t nst i E led at t he pr el imi-
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nary hearing that when he stopped an Hispanic driver, in 80% of 
the cases he would request permission to search the Hispanicfs 
vehicle (T. 12-13). When asked at the suppression hearing, 
"Looking across the median towards his truck you could see that 
he had a blue out of state license platef is that not true?"f the 
Trooper responded, "I do not believe so." (T. 15). Yet at the 
preliminary hearing, the Trooper answered the same question 
with, "I believe so, yes." (T. 16). Then finally, when asked at 
the suppression hearing whether it was his normal police proce-
dure to identify the make of vehicle that was in front of the 
vehicle being cited for Following Too Close, the Trooper 
responded, "Not necessarily. It would be good information to 
have." (T. 29). In contrast, the Trooper testified at the pre-
liminary hearing that he did normally record the license plate of 
the front car. 
Based upon these inconsistencies, as well as the Trooper's 
admission that in 80% of the cases that he stopped an Hispanic 
with out of state license plates that he attempted to search the 
vehicle, the trial court correctly concluded that there was no 
violation for Following Too Close and that the Trooper lacked any 
reasonable or articulable suspicion to stop the Respondent. The 
trial court also correctly concluded that the pretextual stop was 
employed by the Trooper to conceal his genuine investigative pur-
8 
p o s e r * ^ 
' ? * " i ] i 2 e d . - ' t O O p e i . i J S t l L y l'\- S ' -H-) f-' i ' - i ^ *: * 
*: ate 1 icense plates *--. "* jccupant^ ~ r T 3 M n or i q i n , 
2^1' * v . n e n d o z a , IA H Il" , J11 
[8 1 (L*an l-*~ ' o r . ' v ; - ' i •; \ a ^ * rh^ t r i a l c o u r t ' s 
I i nd i n : ? \^r n o t c 1 -vi• ^' * . ' " '- i ! :» sm sf a i i v d 
S t a t e v . L a f f e r t v , . -
Th*3 i m o l a u s ^ r . i 1 i v vl l f i c e r ' s e x p l a r ^ M o n f- * u r a m c 
i - c ^ i : ^ j e c ^ i e i -a-»- ): S t a t e v . S i e r r a , d e c i d e r Ma^ », " ~ ~ 
T h e r ~ M ; - " ' r ' • . , ' • ' ' * / p o t h e t ^ a ' ^ a ^ n a r M - ~ * J •• 
c:>f£i re * i i 
o f f e n s - 1 , i-i I- ' ' ; " r " i M i i • < r ^ u m s t a n c e i n d i c a t e * " 
"^t >v • •> « ^ * -
 r . i s n t a t i o i i d i . - _^ppxyi ' * , 
-•.: . : c . : . - i : . S i e r r a tha*- " ^ ^ ^ ^ M-> a e ^ r - t.-., 
' r ^ . o f c i q a t e \ . ~ r ; - * : \ i s ! , ; .M*- hun * - , a ^ h ^ r ^  
i iu U d L l i r ^ ' 
S i e r r a c a s s . i .« \ . i - , » ; wi ' - : a s - "* .*. o e f o r e t h ^ 
C o u r t , S i e r r a I •• i i s o f s r i v ^ 1 ~nr* - s ^ n * nna^*- ' h^<=* ^-^cord 
c l e a n 
u s e d t h e * ' a ; * ; ' s*. op ~- \ o r e c ^ x t *i; Ji=> ' o v e r e v i d e n c e o: . I l -*-
g a l a c t i v i t y ^w o u p p o i L LUC l i o o p e r ' s h u n c h . 
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POINT II 
THE RESPONDENT'S CONSENT WAS 
FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE 
It has been consistently held that consent to search secured 
immediately following an illegal entry, arrestf or detention, is 
invalid. Consent which is obtained after an illegal arrest, 
entry, or detention and the evidence seized during the search, 
are "fruits" of that "poisonous tree." Wong Sun v. United States, 
371 U.S. 471 (1963); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939); 
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 38 5 (1920). 
In Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), a suspect's con-
sent to search his two suitcases was tained by the illegal deten-
tion and was ineffective to justify the search of his suitcases. 
There the suspect was approached at an airport by detectives who 
asked for the suspectfs airline ticket and driver's license. 
Without returning the ticket and license the detectives asked the 
suspect to accompany them to a small room. The detectives then 
retrieved the suspect's luggage from the airline without his con-
sent. The suspect produced a key and unlocked one suitcase, in 
which drugs were found. The suspect did not object when the 
detectives pried open a second suitcase in which more marijuana 
was found. Because the detention was unlawful, the Supreme Court 
ruled the consent was the fruit of the poisonous tree. Similarly, 
10 
— n"-^4- *— search was held i^vv 11 w V ^ e police entered a defen-
ian' -- apartment xu ur i-*- •:* >< -si tne defendant ana = :,:,xe „.: :: ,; ,„ 
M ' ': rant- wit-hnn . i ; *qt announced their purpose or 
]e r ^i-^d ' ^mselv^s a- ? : J ] - ;ff i c^-rs Th** * , * * > , . the 
- . i n »:*^i) • - .-
People v. Keogh, •»** .1 . ^ tu-. ^ : • j , ] <: 1 ' n / ^ o i v ^ n-
defenda ^ * - - r ^ M * - j a r ^ a" 1 <^i"ir- e: a viai placed beside 
; ,il detention wb^re c on-
•?n~. A 3 ^ qiv-:1 immediateiv a:ti:»r the pel i "e officer retained '"'~;--' 
defendant's - 'iter's J* ^ ~=3<* 1 v *hor --^r^ w^ , 
circumstance- o^tween t •. ivteni1 .n ii. consent. *-- * United States 
v. Thompson , "*i 2 F . 2d ^ ' s u , '^  
; / 
stopp- - - roopet :.- Tr >oi»er requ- .t>-a rna: "he Resoond' nt 
: : r :. **-, -\inn * * i s 1 - drive 1 ' - r , o n s ? ^n^1 registra* ' "*~ 
• - . . , : . . - . 3 * ^ ; . l e . 
" -v- rrooper t-fiiV'i tnese 1 r.ems arj • 'ie~ requested that •-• 
Respondent perF1:- * <- * • - 1 inc v^h:-! ^. Int ^ -
-•-,: ^onnpr i *. letalne - Respondent 
whil e he searched the Kespond^-- H vehici-. In the instant 
matter there • * - *' 1 
unlawful detenti .?. •,,• .• Hesoofiueir •• ^na 1; •-  . f :ae^- have 
reached this same conclusion. 1*. "J^i'-vd States •. r a h e n 648 
11 
F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1981), the Court concluded that even assuming 
the Defendant's voluntary consent, the evidence must be suppressed 
if not sufficiently attenuated from the prior misconduct, for to 
rule otherwise "would encourage police officers to ignore the 
dictates of the Fourth Amendment"; Lindsay v. State, 698 P.2d 659 
(Alaska App. 1985), where Defendant's detention exceeded the 
limits of an investigative detention, and because there was no 
probable cause for the arrest, the consent to search along with a 
statement were "fruits of the poisonous tree"; United States v. 
Gooding, 695 F.2d 78 (4th Cir. 1982), stressing that "the illegal 
seizure and the consent" were "all occurring within the same, 
brief, continuous encounter."; State v. Raheem, 464 SO.2d 29 3 
(LA. 1985), holding consent invalid, Court stressed it came 
within 40 minutes of the unlawful arrest; State v. Mitchell, 360 
SO.2d 189 (LA. 1978), stressing consent invalid after illegal 
arrest; State v. Ragesdale, 381 SO.2d 492 (LA. 1980), invalid 
consent given 30 minutes after defendant's arrest following ille-
gal police entry into apartment without probable cause; United 
States v, Sanchez-Jaramillo, 637 f.2d 1094 (7th Cir. 1980), inva-
lid arrest was calculated to cause surprise, fright and confusion. 
The State in is Brief, cited State v. Valdez, 748 P.2d 1050 
(Utah 1987), for the proposition that a valid search made it 
unnecessary to consider the validity of a search warrant. 
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H o w e v ^ * -= i t -* * i • •  r>. i - r r : > -ii r , and 
-I',;co . - * i S t a t e v. 
Valdez ^ inapposite t w i act - . . * - -* ^  v -^  
^ I ^ ; I I ^ * l,e Stat- l~~; s ai^o cited united riditi „ . J-~,r"§Ic*§' 
76] ; : * . *n r*i r- ^ ^ h ^ c-t-gfo* Q rel ian?e • ipc 
this :as- wou] 1 appeal : - - la.--* '!n^r^ • ••* • l . * ts 
• : i i I: " • - : ce 
o b t a x - i e d a i t t f i t * i . :* . ^ n ^ - ' j r 3 e i Z ; i - j Ti-a -^ b - s u p p r e s s e d ^3 
t;ic» • K I 4 * ^* * ' - ( i f : < 1°t -^ri* i *• * . T'^ * R e c a l d ° 
i l l e g a l arr*--* . * k ~^ .r<' rriT,. -,- rr ;: e s t a t t I - t * - * * » 
causV -onnecu **•*• ~ t h e L1 r-
o b t a , " i^ i . An
 i ( , --q^/: jn*-a^y .,*; -T, - r; . 'An"ii i. * -i a r t 
of free wi 11 * ourqe * o~ r*ri mary tai nt" • :i)f the i 1 ] egal deten-
ti on : decalde Coi ir t • ::oi I ::] ^ ide :i 11 iat 
al thouq-i -he defendan- ' ^  ^7~:ruc[e was properly stopped initially 
for soeed •; - -• ' sequent ^xt^nded detenti on was not justifi ed 
:i r . i: :i t a :: I: i « :> i l s - :> f t I: I e o f f i c e i: s 
I r: r / : ; d i n q t n e a u t o m o r i :* ar---j * v- •-• r a k ing t h e d e f e n d a n t t o t h e 
s ta t i** ' . 5- > — *"?''•-• m^*: i / 'v„ea c n L i i e i ! . by !:: he o i n c e i s *" . t 
i n s t ] net" t ,e defendant - a ^ es ; ^ ent a] ien was ^arisj-.^r: ing 
narcotics. The Court concluded that neit ler Miranda warni ngs nor 
i HI i ill c • ::0'! isiE i: it for i: i i i t^ 
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the coersive circumstances flowing from the unlawful seizure and 
detention. The Court noted that very little time had elapsed 
between the detention and the obtaining of the consent. Finally, 
the Court was impressed that the primary illegality "had a 
qualify of purposefulness." The Court was struck by the fact 
that the arrest, both in design and execution, were investigatory 
and embarked upon by the officer in hopes of turning up something. 
Id. at 1459. 
The same criticism that the pretextual stop "had a quality 
of purposefulness" applies with the same compelling force in the 
case at bar. The State oversimplifies the law when it asserts 
that it was irrelevant if the Trooper did decide to search the 
Respondent's vehicle simply because he was Hispanic and was driving 
a vehicle with out of state license plates. The heart of the 
fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine is based at least in part 
upon the "tainted" motive which the State asserts is irrelevant. 
POINT III 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
CONFERS GREATER PROTECTION THAN THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
PROTECTIONS SECURED BY THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 
The State constitutional protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures is greater in scope than the umbrella pro-
tections conferred by the Fourth Amendment of the Federal 
Constitution. Under Utah Constitutional precepts, any prior 
14 
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i ;-l ' 5 K arr->:in] of!:c^-. T}; • n i l ":Q; "t did noi h^ii-v*-* rh^ 
ueSLimony 
f h a f +"he in:* .-•» . ->:.>t Ln- Responds.11 *v vehiCie w m oretext^al 
;
:rvi .:]Jawfui « •• amolv --..r^ v r *-d "^  * h-j r- Nord. ,ph^ DosponderiL 
- ; .. y --enuatinq 
*_he * =i i it *H -• ni \ r^i^d argued v: , > vjporessi in neariia *i 
*>':^r rv* ' ' ' ^ V ^ r <^  o- i: * * ^riate " 
. s^u *, * v Hdspondenf- .* . . - . ?r-. • 
•-ia" the con? r.-t *hi ^  ••-!-' otai.ned i •? case ATa -: the :r -.• 
Liv- "jisonoub ur-* bui uiese i <^ ~ * -
o^ Suppression should be affirmed. 
IESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of Mayf 1988. 
WALTER F. BUGDEN, JR. 
Attorney for Respondent 
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